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care. I find that the reimbursement change was associated with a large drop in the provision of home care.  
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I. Introduction 
 Long-term care is a policy issue of growing importance in the United States.  In 2000, 
combined home- and community-based care and nursing home costs for the elderly totaled $98 
billion, with Medicare and Medicaid bearing 56% of these costs (U.S. Congress 2000).   This 
spending level corresponds to roughly 10% of national health expenditures and 1% of GDP.  
Moreover, demand for long-term care is expected to increase dramatically over the coming 
decades due to the aging of the population.  Estimates suggest that the number of elderly people 
requiring assistance with activities of daily living will increase by 42% between 2000 and 2020 
(U.S. Congress 2000). Many of these elderly people will require long-term care, in the form of 
nursing home care or home health care. 
 Traditionally, long-term care was synonymous with institutional care at nursing homes.  
In 1980, expenditures for institutional care were seven times greater than expenditures for home 
health care (HHS 2002).  But the past two decades have seen a radical shift in the composition of 
long-term care spending.  Nursing home usage has fallen substantially; between 1985 and 1995, 
there was an 8.2% decline in the share of elderly who reported staying overnight in a nursing 
facility on a given day (Bishop 1999).  And there has been a parallel substantial rise in long-term 
care delivered in the home setting, “home health care”, over the same period, with an 82% 
increase in the share of Medicare beneficiaries who used home care and a 208% increase in the 
number of home care visits per user (U.S. Congress 2000).  As a result, by 1995, expenditures 
for nursing home care were only twice as great as expenditures for home care (HHS 2002). 
 This dramatic shift in the composition of spending on long-term care naturally leads to 
several important questions.  First, was the increased use of home health care during this period 
causally related to the reduction in nursing home use?  Second, given the lower costs associated 
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with providing home care, did the increased use of home health care reduce overall expenditures 
on long-term care?  Finally, what was the impact of increased home care utilization on the health 
status of the elderly? 
 This paper addresses these questions using evidence from a policy change that caused a 
dramatic reversal of home care utilization growth rates.  Specifically, I examine the short-run 
impact of a substantial change to Medicare reimbursement for home care in October 1997. The 
policy change had dramatic aggregate effects, causing an immediate 30% decline in Medicare 
expenditures for home care.   
The reimbursement change, which involved the imposition of average per-patient 
reimbursement caps, also fundamentally changed the incentives faced by home care agencies.  
By shifting from fee-for-service to a more prospective reimbursement system, Medicare’s home 
care program encountered a trade-off between incentives for patient selection and incentives for 
efficiency in the production of medical care (Newhouse (1996)).  In this paper, I model a profit-
maximizing home health agency with two patient types -- long-term and short-term.  The model 
shows that the imposition of an average per-patient cap on Medicare reimbursement can lead the 
agency to intentionally shift the composition of its patients towards short-term patients and to 
provide a lower intensity of care to its long-term patients.  
 The empirical analysis uses data from the 1992-1999 Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS) to examine whether the imposition of average per-patient caps shifted the 
composition of home care utilization and affected health status and use of other types of care.  To 
identify effects of the reimbursement change, I utilize state variation in the restrictiveness of the 
per-patient caps.  In particular, caps were constructed as a weighted average of the historical 
costs per home care user in each agency and the mean historical costs per home care user in each 
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agency’s Census division.  In consequence, agencies with otherwise similar utilization patterns 
faced differential incentives across states to cut back on per-patient costs after the Medicare 
reimbursement policy change.  For example, aggregate data suggests that agencies in Georgia 
and Oklahoma provided similar average amounts of care to their users in the pre-policy years, 
but agencies in Georgia faced more stringent per-patient caps than those in Oklahoma, due to the 
regional component of the per-patient cap calculation.    
 Using this identification strategy, I find significant declines in the utilization of home 
health care in the post-policy period, consistent with aggregate data.  Strikingly, I find that these 
declines were driven exclusively by declines in use among the beneficiaries who appeared likely 
to incur the highest home care costs.  Relatively healthy beneficiaries experienced an 
insignificant increase in home care usage, whereas relatively unhealthy beneficiaries 
experienced a significant decline.  These findings are consistent with the model’s prediction that 
agencies would respond to the reimbursement change by favoring relatively healthy, low-cost 
patients. 
 A subsequent analysis examines how changes in the cap and the consequent use of home 
health care affected utilization of other types of care, providing evidence on the substitutability 
of home care for nursing home and other types of care.  I find no evidence that the policy-
induced reduction in home health care increased the likelihood of receiving long-term facility 
care.  I also find little evidence of increased expenditures for other types of care, although my 
estimates are somewhat imprecise.  Moreover, I find no evidence that this reduction in home 
health care utilization had an adverse impact on the health of the elderly.  
One possible explanation for these findings is that individuals offset the cuts in financing 
for public home health care visits by increasing their own out-of-pocket spending on home health 
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care.  I find evidence that roughly 22% of the decline in Medicare home health care spending 
was offset by increased out-of-pocket spending.  Increases in out-of-pocket spending were 
concentrated among relatively high-income beneficiaries but, even among those low-income 
beneficiaries who did not offset the cuts, there was no offsetting increase in other health care 
spending and no adverse impact on health. 
Finally, the fact that individuals desired to offset some of these public spending cuts 
suggests that they were partially valued on the margin.  I therefore discuss the welfare 
consequences of this policy change, but conclude that the net effect on welfare was ambiguous. 
 
II. Background 
Home health care is medical care that is provided in the home of the patient.  To qualify 
for Medicare coverage of home health care, a beneficiary must be home-bound, under the care of 
a physician and require part-time or intermittent skilled care.  The early 1990s witnessed 
unprecedented growth in Medicare expenditures for home health care, with expenditures 
increasing from $3.4 billion in 1989 to $19.2 billion in 1996.1  During this time, the percentage 
of beneficiaries who used home care almost doubled—from 5.1% to 9.5%—and the number of 
visits per user almost tripled—from 27 to 79 (U.S. Congress 2000).  This growth was 
precipitated by a liberalization of the Medicare home care benefit rules, following the settlement 
of a class action lawsuit in 1988.  Newhouse (2002) argues that this growth also reflects 
increased use of post-acute care as a substitute for the last days of a hospital stay, in response to 
Medicare’s prospective payment system (PPS) for hospital care.   
In response to rapidly rising expenditures, Congress mandated the development of a PPS 
for home care in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97).  In order to slow the growth of 
                                                 
1 Dollar amounts, throughout the paper, are in real (1999) dollars 
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home health expenditures in the interim before the PPS was ready to be implemented, BBA 97 
also created an “Interim Payment System” (IPS) that took effect in October 1997.  At the same 
time, Congress mandated PPS for Medicare reimbursement of other forms of post-acute care, 
including short-term skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and rehabilitation services, but the IPS was 
the first policy to take effect.   
Prior to BBA 97, home care agencies were reimbursed for their “reasonable” costs, 
subject to a per-visit cap.  The per-visit cap, which was equal to 112% of the national average 
cost for each type of visit, was applied to aggregate agency payments.  This reimbursement 
policy was considered inadequate, because agencies had no incentive to minimize the number of 
visits provided to each patient.  Furthermore, there were no financial constraints on demand, 
because beneficiaries face no cost-sharing for home care. 
Beginning in October 1997, the IPS added an additional limit to the calculation of agency 
reimbursements: an annual per-patient cap.  This new, agency-specific cap was calculated as a 
weighted average of each agency’s 1994 average per-patient costs and the 1994 regional average 
per-patient costs.  The agency’s own average per-patient costs comprised 75% of the cap, with 
the regional average per-patient costs comprising the remaining 25%.2  Thus, those agencies that 
had above-average per-patient costs within their region in 1994 received per-patient caps that 
were lower than their 1994 per-patient costs; agencies that had below-average per-patient costs 
in 1994 received caps that were higher than their 1994 per-patient costs.  In a regulatory impact 
statement in March 1998, HCFA projected that 58% of agencies would exceed the per-patient 
cap; by the following year, this projection was raised to 79% (Federal Register 1998, 1999). 
                                                 
2 “New” agencies, for whom 1994 reimbursement information was not available, received a cap equal to the national 
median cap, adjusted for regional differences in labor costs.  In response to complaints that this formula led to new 
agencies in some areas receiving more generous caps than old agencies, 1999 caps for “old” agencies with caps 
below the national median were increased.  The increase was equal to one-third of the difference between the 
agency’s baseline cap and the cap for new agencies. 
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Newhouse (1996) shows that prospective reimbursement, such as the IPS, yields two 
distinct incentives for health care providers: (1) a production efficiency incentive arising from 
the fact that providers can keep any residual reimbursement; and (2) a selection incentive arising 
from the fact that lump-sum payment transfers the risk of high costs to the provider.  Newhouse 
reviews the empirical evidence on this issue, which generally supports the theoretical prediction 
that providers and insurers respond to capitated payments by selecting the healthiest patients.  It 
follows that full prospectivity is unlikely to be optimal, due to the welfare loss from increased 
patient selection. 
 Empirical evidence about the response of home health agencies to a transition from fee-
for-service to prospective reimbursement is available from an experiment in the early 1990s.  
Cheh (2001) evaluates the impact of the experimental PPS on patient selection, health care 
utilization and health outcomes.  She finds strong evidence of declines in home care utilization, 
but little evidence of patient selection, adverse health effects, or increased utilization of other 
forms of care.  However, there are several reasons that these conclusions may not generalize to 
the situation of BBA 97.  First, important features of the experimental PPS—notably, the use of 
adjustments for agency case-mix— were not used in the IPS.  Second, agencies participated 
voluntarily in the experiment and were insured against 97-99% of any losses that were generated 
as a result of the experimental PPS.  In contrast, the IPS was mandatory and did not offer any 
insurance against agency losses.  As a result, agencies may have reacted more strongly to the IPS 
than they did to the experimental PPS.  
In January 1998, CBO projected that BBA 97 would lead to a slowing of the growth rate 
of Medicare’s home care expenditures (CBO 1997).  However, as Figure 1 shows, home health 
expenditures actually plummeted by almost $6 billion in 1998.  Figures 2 and 3 show that both 
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the dramatic pre-1997 increase in expenditures and the striking post-1997 decline in expenditures 
were driven primarily by changes in the number of visits per beneficiary, rather than changes in 
costs per visit.  Data from the Health Care Financing Review’s annual statistical supplement 
indicate that the striking decline in visits per beneficiary reflects substantial decreases in both the 
share of beneficiaries who used home care (an 11% decline between 1996 and 1998) and in the 
number of visits per user (a 31% decline between 1996 and 1998).   
Some observers have complained that declines in home care led to increases in the 
utilization of other forms of health care.3  Indeed, it is plausible that Medicare could lose money 
by cutting back on home care reimbursement if, for example, the policy change led patients to 
substitute relatively expensive inpatient care for less expensive home care.  Alternatively, 
Medicaid or individual patients could bear financial costs if patients moved from home care to 
nursing homes.   
The issue of substitution between home care and other forms of care has long been a 
question of interest to health economists.  In the early 1980s, the National Long Term Care 
Demonstration project was implemented, providing case management and community services to 
a treatment group.  Kemper (1988) summarizes the conclusions of the evaluation.  He reports 
that patients and informal care-givers in the treatment group were more satisfied with the care 
and quality of life; however, the additional services led to higher net costs because there were no 
offsetting decreases in the costs of other care, notably nursing home care.  The findings of other, 
smaller demonstrations have suggested that there may be some opportunities for home care to 
                                                 
3  For instance, a hospital administrator told the New York Times, “Our hospital has been busier since the cutbacks in 
home health care.  We attribute quite a bit of that to the fact that we can’t provide adequate home care.  Patients are 
admitted or readmitted to the hospital or to a nursing home, and both of those are more expensive than home care” 
(Pear 2000). 
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substitute for other care, especially if increases in home care usage are well-targeted.4  However, 
in the 20 years since these experiments, many aspects of the health care system – such as hospital 
reimbursement – have changed in ways that are likely to have impacted home care utilization 
patterns.  This paper provides updated evidence that is more relevant in the current health care 
environment. 
 Hadley et al. (2000) consider the relationship between post-acute Medicare home health 
care and health status in the early 1990s.  They rely on year effects and regional market 
characteristics to identify the impact of home health care and find a positive effect.  Their 
research, however, focuses only on a subset of home health users and is therefore not 
generalizable to the case of the IPS. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 The intention behind the IPS legislation was to provide an incentive for agencies to 
provide care efficiently.  Lawmakers intended that “payments on behalf of patients whose costs 
were lower than average would ‘subsidize’ more costly patients; the balance of low and high cost 
patients would determine whether an agency would exceed its aggregate per beneficiary cap” 
(U.S. Congress 2000).  However, a simple model, evaluated under reasonable assumptions, 
suggests that the IPS also introduced an incentive for agencies to favor patients who appeared 
likely to incur low costs.  
 
                                                 
4 Hughes, Susan, Larry Manheim, Perry Edelman, and Kendon Conrad (1987).  Kemper (1988) cites additional 
evidence from Blackman, D. et al (1985). South Carolina Community Long Term Care Project: Report of Findings.  
Spartanburg: South Carolina State Health and Human Services Commission. 
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Pre-policy 
Suppose there are two types of patients, those with short-term needs, type S, and those 
with long-term needs, type L.  An agency chooses the number of short-term patients to treat, NS, 
and the number of long-term patients to treat, NL, to maximize its profits.  Under pre-policy 
reimbursement, the agency receives reimbursement, P, for each unit of care intensity provided to 
either type of patient.  P is fixed at Medicare’s per-visit cap for each visit.  I initially assume that 
the level of care intensity, Ii, is fixed for each type of patient.  It is convenient to think of Ii as the 
number of home health care visits for a patient of type i.  The cost of providing a unit of care 
intensity is C.  I assume that P is greater than C to insure agency solvency.  The agency’s profits 
are equal to the number of patients of each type that it chooses to treat, Ni, multiplied by the per-
patient profit for each type of patient: ( )ii ICIP ⋅−⋅ .  The number of patients treated, Ni, is 
constrained to be less than or equal to the number of patients who demand services from the 
agency, Di, which is initially assumed to be exogenously determined. The Lagrangian is: 
  
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LLSSLLLSSS DNDNICIPNICIPNL −⋅−−⋅−⋅−⋅⋅+⋅−⋅⋅= γµ  
  
The first-order conditions show that, because PIi is assumed to be greater than CIi, the demand 
constraints must be binding.  Agencies will treat as many patients of type i as are available, 
because the marginal profit from treating an additional patient is always positive.  The following 
graph shows the price and cost curves for long-term patients.  As the first-order conditions 
suggest, NL is determined by DL in this graph.  The graph for short-term patients is comparable. 
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Post-policy 
The policy change can be incorporated into this simple model by adding an average per-patient 
cap, X , to the pre-policy reimbursement formula.  Under the cap, reimbursements are restricted 
to be no greater than )( LS NNX +⋅ . That is, an additional constraint is added to the profit 
maximization problem: 
 
(2)  )()( LSLLSS NNXININP +⋅≤⋅+⋅⋅  
 
For the purpose of the analysis, I assume that LS ICXIP ⋅≤≤⋅  and that the reimbursement 
constraint is binding.   
It may seem counterintuitive that an agency would continue to treat long-term patients at 
all when LICX ⋅≤ .  However, an agency will continue to receive full pre-policy reimbursement 
for the marginal long-term patient ( LIP ⋅ ) so long as the agency’s average reimbursement 
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remains below the per-patient cap ( X ).  Average reimbursement will remain below the cap as 
long as the agency treats enough short-term patients, whose costs all fall below the cap. 
Agencies will maximize profit subject to the original demand constraints and subject to 
the new reimbursement constraint.  The new Lagrangian is: 
 
(3) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )LLSS
LSLLSS
LLLSSS
DNDN
NNXININP
ICIPNICIPNL
−⋅−−⋅−
+⋅−⋅+⋅⋅⋅−
⋅−⋅⋅+⋅−⋅⋅=
γµ
λ  
The new first-order conditions for profit maximization are therefore: 
(4) ( ) ( ) 0=−−⋅⋅−⋅−⋅= µλ XIPICIP
dN
dL
SSS
S
 
and: 
(5) ( ) ( ) 0=−−⋅⋅−⋅−⋅= γλ XIPICIP
dN
dL
LLL
L
 
 
Because of the assumption that 0>−CP , we know that the first term of (4) is positive.  
Because of the assumption that XIP S ≤⋅ , we know that the second term of (4) is also positive.  
Therefore, in order to set the first-order condition equal to zero, it must be the case that µ is also 
positive. This fact implies that the constraint, SS DN ≤ , is binding.  In contrast, it is not 
necessarily true that the demand constraint for long-term patients, LL DN ≤ , is binding, because 
the first term of (5) is positive and the second term of (5) is negative.  Moreover, if the per-
patient cap is a binding constraint on reimbursement, it follows that there is a single value of NL, 
*
LN , that maximizes agency profit.  By the reimbursement constraint, it must be the case that: 
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(6)  ( )XIP IPXDN L SSL −⋅
⋅−⋅= )(*  
 
This equation implies that the agency will treat more long-term patients as the demand among 
short-term patients increases, because each additional short-term patient eases the reimbursement 
cap.  The agency will treat more long-term patients as the difference between the cap and SIP ⋅  
increases, because this difference also eases the cap.  The agency will treat fewer long-term 
patients as the difference between the cap and LIP ⋅  increases, because this difference increases 
the constraint imposed by the reimbursement cap.  This equation highlights the link between the 
reimbursement that an agency receives for short-term patients and its ability to profitably treat 
any long-term patients. Reimbursement for short-term patients is always below the cap and, 
therefore, allows the agency to stay below the cap on average while collecting reimbursement 
above the cap for some long-term patients.   
 The following graph illustrates this point by showing the marginal reimbursement and 
marginal cost curves for long-term patients, for a given level of short-term patient demand.  
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 At points below *LN , the agency receives full reimbursement, LIP ⋅ , for each long-term 
patient, because there are enough short-term patients that the per-patient cap is not a binding 
constraint.  Because the marginal profit from an additional long-term patient is positive, the 
agency will meet all demand in this range.  At points above *LN , however, the agency receives 
only X , which is below the cost, for each long-term patient.  Per-patient marginal profits are 
negative in this range, so the agency will choose to provide care to no more than *LN  patients. 
One element of this model that seems particularly unrealistic is the assumption that 
agencies cannot adjust Ii, the number of visits that they provide to a particular type of 
beneficiary.  Solving a more detailed model, which allows for some adjustment of Ii and assumes 
that demand is an increasing function of Ii, yields the same prediction as the simpler model, plus 
an additional prediction: agencies are more likely to decrease the intensity of care to long-term 
patients than to short-term patients.  This new prediction reflects the fact that an increase in the 
intensity of care to short-term patients has the benefit of relaxing the demand constraint.  
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Increasing intensity of care to long-term patients is less beneficial to the agency, however, since 
demand is less likely to be a constraint.  
 The insight provided by this model is that, under reasonable assumptions, agencies may 
attempt to increase the share of short-term patients in their caseload and may provide higher 
intensity of care to those patients in order to attract more of them.  Agencies may also decrease 
the share of long-term patients and decrease the intensity of care provided to them.  The 
differential impact of the average per-patient cap on the probability that long-term patients 
receive any care is an important prediction of the model and is tested in Section 6 of the paper.  
The prediction that the per-patient cap will differentially affect intensity of care for long-term 
patients, however, is not directly testable. 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy 
 I use data from the MCBS to consider agency responses to the IPS and related changes in 
beneficiary utilization of care and health status.  The MCBS surveys a rotating panel of Medicare 
beneficiaries, with an over-sampling of older beneficiaries. It combines administrative data from 
Medicare claims with survey data from several interviews with beneficiaries (or proxies, for 
beneficiaries who cannot participate in an interview) over the course of a year.  The resulting 
data set provides information on utilization and costs of medical care, in addition to information 
on demographics and health status.  Utilization and costs are categorized based on the type of 
care and the setting; categories include long-term facility, short-term institutional, inpatient, 
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outpatient, medical provider, home health, hospice, and prescription drugs.5  The key dependent 
variables in my analyses are annual expenditures for each type of care. 
The MCBS was conducted annually beginning in 1992.  My data include 99,005 
Medicare beneficiary observations from the 1992-1999 surveys, including 14,597 observations 
that report some home health utilization during the year. 6  Of the home health users, 3,634 were 
in the post-policy period.   
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.  The first column shows statistics for the full 
sample.  The second column provides summary statistics for observations that have relatively 
high predicted home care costs.  Predicted costs were imputed based on each observation’s 
characteristics and the coefficients from a regression of total home care costs on individual 
characteristics among those observations that had home health expenditures in the pre-policy 
period.  The resulting predicted costs are a measure of the costs that each person was likely to 
have incurred if they had used home health care during the pre-policy period.  The characteristics 
that were used to predict home care costs include age, gender, marital status, race, difficulties 
with walking, writing, lifting and stooping, as well as 18 diagnosis dummy variables.7  Table 2 
shows some of the coefficients on the characteristics that were used to impute predicted costs to 
the full sample.  I define “high cost” beneficiaries as those individuals whose predicted costs are 
above $3,877, the 75th percentile prediction for all Medicare beneficiaries in the sample.  The 
summary statistics in Table 1 show that the group with relatively high predicted costs has higher 
utilization levels of all forms of medical care than the predicted low-cost beneficiaries, reflecting 
                                                 
5 Facility care and institutional care both refer to nursing home care; they are distinguished by the expected length of 
care.  Medical provider events may refer to doctor visits, laboratory and surgical services, or purchases of medical 
equipment and supplies. 
6  1,812 observations are excluded from the main analysis because of missing covariate values. 
7 Eighteen diagnosis dummy variables indicate whether an individual has ever received a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s 
disease, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, cancer, diabetes, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, 
mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, 
Parkinson’s disease, stroke, and amputation of an arm or leg. 
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the relatively poor health of observations in the predicted high-cost group.  In the empirical 
analysis, I test for differential impacts of the IPS on these two groups of beneficiaries. 
I exploit state-level variation in the restrictiveness of IPS per-patient caps to identify the 
effect of the caps on beneficiary utilization of care and health outcomes.  The predictions of the 
model were for individual agencies but they should also hold, on average, at the state level.  
Variation in restrictiveness arises from the fact that the per-patient cap was based on both the 
agency’s historical costs and the region’s average historical costs.  Thus, agencies that had 
above-average costs within their region were penalized by the regional component of the cap and 
faced more restrictive caps; agencies that had below-average costs within their region benefited 
from the regional component of the cap and faced less restrictive caps.   
For my empirical analysis, I create a measure of restrictiveness based on the 1994 state 
average visits per user, published in the Health Care Financing Review’s annual statistical 
supplement.  Restrictiveness technically depends on 1994 Medicare payments per user, but these 
payments – as well as the IPS caps – are adjusted across localities to reflect the differences in the 
costs of providing care.  Thus, visits per user provide a measure of utilization that is more 
directly comparable across regions and yields a more accurate measure of actual restrictiveness 
than a measure using payment data.8  From each state’s average visits per user in 1994, I subtract 
the average visits per user in that state’s Census division, the relevant region for calculating per-
patient caps.9  The resulting measure of restrictiveness ranges from -41 to +35 visits.  In the 
analysis below, I use this measure, interacted with a dummy variable indicating the post-policy 
period, to identify the effects of the IPS.  I define the post-policy period as the years 1998 and 
                                                 
8 When a payment-based measure of restrictiveness is used, instead of the preferred visits-based measure, the results 
of the analysis are qualitatively unchanged. 
9 For 1999 data, I adjust the measure of restrictiveness to reflect increases in caps for those states that had average 
caps below the national median cap. 
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1999; the last 3 months of 1997 are technically part of the post-policy period but, because the 
data is annual, these months are included with pre-policy data in my analysis.10 
To graphically illustrate the basis for my identification strategy, I have classified states 
into “high”, “medium” and “low” restrictiveness states, based on the continuous measure of 
restrictiveness that is used in regressions.  Figures 4 and 5 use aggregate data from the Health 
Care Financing Review’s annual statistical supplement to show that states with relatively 
restrictive caps had pre-policy trends that were similar to states with relatively unrestrictive caps, 
but experienced substantially larger post-policy declines in home care usage.11  States with 
relatively restrictive caps experienced a 32% decline in users per beneficiary and a 47% decline 
in visits per user between 1996 and 1999.  In contrast, states with relatively unrestrictive caps 
experienced a 24% decline in users per beneficiary and a 37% decline in visits per user. 
The basic estimating equation takes the following form: 
(7) 
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The coefficient of interest, γ1, is on the interaction between the state-level measure of 
restrictiveness and the post-policy dummy variable; this coefficient is shown in the first row of 
each column in each of the tables that is discussed below.  This coefficient measures the impact 
of living—during the post-policy period—in a state that provided an additional one visit per user 
above the regional average during the pre-policy period.  I control separately for state and year 
fixed effects, state trends, as well as separate state and year fixed effects and state trends for 
                                                 
10 The qualitative results of the analysis are not sensitive to exclusion of the 1997 data.  The magnitudes of the 
effects on home health care are, as expected, larger when 1997 is excluded. 
11 Aggregate data for 1999 is from GAO (2000). 
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beneficiaries with high predicted costs, and individual characteristics and diagnoses.  
Coefficients for some of these control variables are shown in the lower rows of each table.   
The main regressions of interest in my analysis use continuous dependent variables.  I 
estimate these equations using OLS.  For binary dependent variables, I report marginal effects 
from Probit estimation. 
 The critical identifying assumption of the empirical strategy is that there are no 
differential trends in states that faced relatively high restrictiveness due to the IPS.  For example, 
if there were mean reversion in home care utilization, states with high pre-policy usage would 
experience decreases in utilization in the post-policy period, even in the absence of any policy 
change.  Because states that faced relatively high restrictiveness also had relatively high pre-
policy utilization levels, there is a possibility that my measure of restrictiveness simply captures 
the mean reversion of high utilization states.  It is important to note, first of all, that there is no 
evidence of mean reversion in the pre-policy period (as shown in Figures 4 and 5), so it is not 
clear why we should expect mean reversion in the post-policy period.     
Nevertheless, mean reversion is a concern and one of the ways that I address it is by 
using the fact that my measure of restrictiveness depends on a state’s pre-policy utilization 
relative to other states in its region, not relative to the rest of the country.  States that have 
similar pre-policy utilization may face the same degree of mean reversion, but would face 
different IPS restrictiveness depending on whether their utilization is higher or lower than other 
states in the division.12  Likewise, states that have very similar measures of restrictiveness had 
very different utilization levels in 1994.13   
                                                 
12 For instance, in 1994, home health users in Oklahoma received an average of 106 visits and users in Georgia 
received a comparable 102 visits (Health Care Financing Review 1996).  However, the IPS was substantially more 
restrictive for Georgia, because the average home health user in Georgia in 1994 received 33 more visits than the 
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In order to formally account for the possibility of mean reversion in my empirical 
analysis, I run my regressions both with and without a control for mean reversion.  The mean 
reversion control variable is an interaction between the 1994 average visits per user in each state 
and a dummy variable for the post-policy period.  This additional term accounts for the fact that 
states with high utilization in the pre-policy period may have decreased their utilization even in 
the absence of the IPS.   As discussed below, the majority of my results are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of this additional term.  This specification takes the following form: 
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V.  Empirical Results 
A.  Effect on Home Health Care Utilization 
The results for home care utilization in Table 3 confirm the evidence from aggregate 
data: beneficiaries in states that had above-regional-average visits per user in 1994 had larger 
declines in home health care utilization in the post-policy period.  To interpret the magnitude of 
the coefficients, I calculate the implied impact on a “typical” state, which received a per-
beneficiary cap that precluded reimbursement for 6.32 visits that the typical pre-policy user 
received.  The assumption that the per-beneficiary cap would permit reimbursement for 6.32 
                                                                                                                                                             
average user in the region; the average user in Oklahoma, in contrast, received only 4 more visits than the average 
user in the region. 
13 The restrictiveness measures for Kansas and Mississippi are 9 and 8, respectively, but users in Kansas in 1994 
received an average of 56 visits, whereas users in Mississippi received an average of 114 visits (Health Care 
Financing Review 1996). 
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fewer visits per user in a typical state is based on pre-policy utilization levels and HCFA’s 1999 
estimates of how tightly the caps constrained agency reimbursement.14  
The first column of Table 3 shows results for a regression that controls only for state and 
year fixed effects and implies a decline of 3.4 visits per beneficiary in the “typical” state.  The 
second column illustrates that the results are robust to inclusion of individual-level covariates, 
implying a decline of 3.3 visits per beneficiary in the typical state. The third column, which 
corresponds to the basic estimating equation specified in Equation 7, adds controls for state-level 
trends. The coefficient implies a decline of 4.9 visits per beneficiary in the typical state.  Finally, 
the fourth column adds the interaction between 1994 state average visits per user and a post-
policy dummy variable.  In this specification, the implied impact of the IPS is a decrease of 2.8 
visits.   In fact, average visits per beneficiary fell by 4.6 between 1996 and 1999, so each of these 
regressions suggests an impact of the IPS that is consistent with the aggregate data. 
These regression results show the impact on average utilization of home health care.  In 
Figures 6 and 7, I provide graphical evidence of the change in the distribution of home care visits 
in states with relatively unrestrictive caps (Figure 6) and in states with relatively restrictive caps 
(Figure 7).  These figures suggest that the IPS led to a decline in the likelihood of receiving 50 or 
more visits, but did not substantially decrease the likelihood of receiving fewer than 50 visits.  
The fact that there was little change in the likelihood of receiving fewer than 50 visits could 
                                                 
14 I begin with HCFA’s estimate that agencies that faced binding constraints would exceed the cost limits by an 
average of 12% (Federal Register 1999).  This 12% estimate is likely to understate the initial post-policy 
restrictiveness, since agencies had presumably adjusted some of their behavior by 1999.  Applying this conservative 
12% estimate to the average pre-policy (1996) utilization level of 73.6 visits per user, I determine that the typical 
agency that faced a binding cap provided 7.9 visits per user (in the pre-policy period) that would not be reimbursed 
in the post-policy period (Health Care Financing Review 1998).  Then, accounting for HCFA’s estimate that the 
per-patient cap was not a binding constraint for 21% of agencies, I determine that an average agency in an average 
state faced a cap that precluded reimbursement of 6.32 visits that the average pre-policy beneficiary received 
(Federal Register 1999).  This provides a conservative estimate of the reimbursement constraint that the typical state 
faced after BBA 97.  Since the coefficients in the tables measure the impact of a cap that precludes reimbursement 
for an additional 0.25 visits per user, I multiply the coefficient in the table by 25.28 (6.32*4) in order to estimate the 
impact for a typical state. 
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obscure changes in the composition of beneficiaries who received those visits.  But the fact that 
the effects of the IPS are most visible in the upper part of the distribution suggests that the 
impact of the IPS may have been concentrated among those beneficiaries whose pre-policy 
utilization would have exceeded the per-patient caps. 
The theoretical framework in Section 4 suggests that the negative impact of the IPS on 
utilization should be stronger for relatively unhealthy beneficiaries.  Therefore, in results shown 
in Table 4, I interact the treatment variable with a dummy variable for having “high” predicted 
costs. 15  The results for the basic estimating equation in column 3 reveal an impact on utilization 
among high-cost beneficiaries that is 29 times as large as the impact on low-cost beneficiaries.  
Moreover, the results in column 4, which control for mean reversion, suggest no decline in 
utilization among low-cost beneficiaries.  Instead, in the typical state, beneficiaries with low 
predicted costs received an additional 1.5 home care visits, while beneficiaries with high 
predicted costs received 13.2 fewer home care visits. 
There are two potential explanations for the larger declines among relatively unhealthy 
beneficiaries.  The larger declines could reflect the fact that patients with high predicted costs use 
about six times more home care on average than those with low predicted costs and therefore had 
a greater opportunity to decrease utilization.  The larger declines could also reflect a behavioral 
effect, arising from agencies’ efforts to cut back on care to patients who were most likely to 
exceed per-patient caps.  The results in Table 4 generally support the latter explanation.  The 
results in column 3 suggest that, even as a share of mean home care use, the decline among high-
cost beneficiaries was greater than the decline among low-cost beneficiaries.  Likewise, the 
                                                 
15 These regressions also control for second-order interactions between the state measure of restrictiveness, the post-
policy dummy variable, and the high predicted costs dummy variable. 
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results in column 4 indicate that the negative effects of the IPS on home health care usage were 
driven exclusively by significant negative effects among the predicted high cost beneficiaries.   
 In Table 5, I show basic results, estimated using Equation 8, for other measures of home 
health utilization.16  These results provide additional evidence that agencies responded to the IPS 
by differentially cutting back on care to relatively unhealthy beneficiaries.  In particular, high-
cost beneficiaries faced a significant decline in the probability of receiving any Medicare home 
health care, whereas low-cost beneficiaries faced a significant increase.  Likewise, high-cost 
beneficiaries experienced a significant decline in Medicare expenditures for home health care, 
whereas low-cost beneficiaries experienced a significant increase.  For the typical state, the 
coefficients imply a $365 decline in Medicare home care spending per high-cost beneficiary and 
an $81 increase in Medicare home care spending per low-cost beneficiary.    
It is unfortunately not possible to consider the impact of the IPS on the number of home 
health care visits, conditional on receiving any, because the IPS had an effect on the home care 
participation margin.  However, it is possible to determine how much of the estimated effect on 
unconditional Medicare home care spending can be explained by the estimated change in 
Medicare home care participation implied by the coefficients in column 2 of Table 5.  If the 
predicted high-cost beneficiaries who stopped receiving any Medicare home health care after the 
IPS were average predicted high-cost users, the implied one percentage point decrease in the 
probability of receiving any home care explains only 11% of the $365 unconditional decline in 
Medicare home health spending among high-cost users in the typical state.  Thus, the remaining 
89% of the unconditional decline must be explained either by a $1,062 decrease in home care 
spending per user or by additional cream-skimming within the predicted high-cost beneficiaries 
(or by a combination of both).  
                                                 
16 Results estimated using Equation 7 are similar and, therefore, are not shown. 
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B. Effects on Other Usage and Health Outcomes 
Tables 6 through 8 provide evidence on substitution between home health care and other 
types of care and are, therefore, relevant for assessing the overall effect of the IPS on efficiency 
in the production of medical care.  The impact of IPS restrictiveness on long-term facility care is 
shown in Table 6.  The coefficients indicate no significant effect of the IPS on the probability of 
using any long-term nursing home care or on expenditures among the high-cost or low-cost 
beneficiaries.17  The standard errors are sufficiently small that, for the typical state, I can reject 
increases in the likelihood of a high-cost beneficiary receiving any long-term facility care that 
are greater than 0.4 percentage points.  Relative to the mean probability of any facility events for 
high-cost beneficiaries (27%), this maximum 0.4 percentage point increase is relatively minor. 
Because the results for measures of utilization of other types of care are similar to the 
results for long-term care facilities, I show only selected utilization measures in Tables 7 and 8.  
Although the results suggest no significant impact of the IPS on any of these expenditure 
measures, the standard errors are sufficiently large that it is impossible to reject a sizeable 
impact.  Thus, the results for substitution towards other care are merely suggestive that there was 
no impact.  
 Because the IPS led to a large decline in home care usage among some of Medicare’s 
most unhealthy beneficiaries, it provides a good opportunity to assess the benefits of home health 
care for beneficiary health outcomes.  I use several measures of health, including body mass 
index (BMI), functional limitations and mortality.  Table 9 shows the impact on BMI, the 
                                                 
17 The finding of no substitution towards long-term facilities could, in theory, reflect the existence of excess demand 
for nursing home beds that has been previously reported.  However, Grabowski (2001) summarizes the most recent 
evidence, which suggests a shift away from excess demand in the nursing home market in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Nursing home occupancy rates were roughly 89% in 1996 (Harrington, Swan et al. 1998). 
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probability of being underweight, and the probability of being overweight. Table 10 shows the 
effects on reported difficulties with three activities: stooping or kneeling, lifting 10 pounds, and 
walking 2-3 blocks.18  The dependent variable in each column is a dummy variable for reporting 
a lot of difficulty or an inability to perform the activity. In each case, there is no significant effect 
of the IPS. Finally, in results that are not reported in tables, I estimate effects on mortality, but do 
not find any impact.  These measures of health outcomes are obviously quite coarse and, thus, 
should be interpreted as suggestive rather than conclusive.  Nevertheless, they do not suggest any 
adverse health consequences associated with declines in home care.  
 There are several possible explanations for finding no evidence of a negative impact on 
health.  For instance, it may be the case that the visits that were cut back after the IPS were less 
medically necessary than the visits that were not cut back.19  Another possible explanation is that 
the decline in publicly provided home health care visits led to an increase in informal care by 
family and friends.  This explanation is not directly testable in the data.  In addition, there may 
have been impacts on aspects of health or well-being that are not measured in this data, or 
impacts that affected only a small subset of patients rather than the overall Medicare population. 
Another possible explanation for these findings is that individuals offset the reduction in 
Medicare-provided home health care visits by obtaining home health care through other sources 
of payment.  Thus, in Table 11, I show the impact of the IPS on total home health care spending, 
and decompose the impact among the three largest sources of payment for home care: Medicare, 
                                                 
18 These regressions necessarily exclude functional limitations from the set of explanatory variables and from the 
home care cost prediction equations.  This change raises the question of whether functional limitations should be 
used as control variables in any regressions, since they are potential outcomes.  Results that are not shown in the 
tables reveal that my findings are not sensitive to the exclusion of functional limitation control variables.  
19 McCall et al. (2001) report that the composition of Medicare home health visits shifted away from home health 
aide visits and towards skilled care after BBA 97.  If the home health aide visits provided the least marginal medical 
value, it may not be surprising that there are no observable adverse impacts on health status. 
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Medicaid and beneficiary out-of-pocket expenditures. 20  I do not find a significant increase in 
Medicaid home health care spending, but I do find a significant increase in out-of-pocket home 
health spending among high-cost beneficiaries.  In particular, twenty-two percent of the 
estimated decline in Medicare spending among high-cost beneficiaries was offset by increases in 
out-of-pocket expenditures.  This finding is consistent with aggregate data, which indicate that 
out-of-pocket expenditures for home- and community-based long-term care for the elderly nearly 
doubled between 1995 and 2000, rising from $6 billion to $11 billion (U.S. Congress 1998, 
2000).  The evidence, therefore, suggests that some of the cost savings from the IPS were not, in 
the broadest terms, cost savings; rather, the costs were shifted to other payers. 
 Given that some of the decline in Medicare home health care was offset by increases in 
out-of-pocket expenditures, an important question is whether lower income beneficiaries—who 
may not be able to afford to pay for their own home health care—experienced larger declines in 
home health care.  Table 12 shows key regression coefficients separately for beneficiaries with 
incomes below and above the poverty line.  Columns 1 and 4 show the means of the dependent 
variables for the low- and high-income sub-samples.  Columns 2 and 5 show the coefficient on 
the interaction between a post-policy dummy variable and the state-level restrictiveness measure.  
Columns 3 and 6 show the coefficient (from the same regression) on the interaction between the 
predicted high-cost dummy variable, the post-policy dummy variable, and the restrictiveness 
measure. 
The most striking difference between high- and low-income beneficiaries is that low-
income beneficiaries did not offset Medicare spending reductions with out-of-pocket 
expenditures.  Rather, the increases in out-of-pocket expenditures were concentrated among the 
                                                 
20 There is likely to be more under-reporting in the non-Medicare payments for home health care, because these data 
are based only on survey responses, rather than administrative data. 
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high-income beneficiaries, who offset 63% of Medicare’s spending decreases.  As a result, high-
income beneficiaries experienced substantially smaller declines in home care use than low-
income beneficiaries.  The results imply that high-income beneficiaries with high predicted costs 
in a typical state received 8.8 fewer visits per beneficiary after the IPS; low-income beneficiaries 
with high predicted costs in the same state received 19.4 fewer visits. 
 The table also shows coefficients for several key measures of health care utilization and 
health outcomes, separately by income level.  These results provide little evidence of substitution 
towards other types of care or of adverse health outcomes, even among the lower-income sub-
sample that experienced larger net declines in home care utilization. 
One concern about the results is the issue of external validity.   If the IPS led agencies to cut 
back on precisely those home care visits that had the lowest marginal medical value, it is 
possible that further cuts would induce observable declines in health status in the overall 
Medicare population.  Another caveat to the present results is that they represent short-run 
outcomes.  Some agencies may have required a year to fully ascertain the implications of the 
reimbursement changes or to fully incorporate changes to their procedures.21 Likewise, it is 
possible that some effects on health outcomes would not become immediately apparent.  Thus, 
the results that are reported here could be an overestimate or underestimate of the long-run 
impact of the IPS.   
 
C. Identification and Specification Checks 
I find that the results are robust to a variety of specification checks: using different 
cutoffs for “high” predicted costs, allowing separate effects of the IPS for all four quartiles of the 
                                                 
21 Indeed, when the IPS effects on home care utilization are separated into effects for 1998 and 1999, the magnitude 
of the 1998 effect is larger.  This finding may suggest that agencies initially over-reacted to the IPS and moderated 
their response in the longer-run. 
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distribution of predicted costs22,  using cross-sectional weights, using state average visits per user 
in 1996 (rather than 1994) for the mean reversion control variable, excluding functional 
limitations as explanatory variables, controlling for the use of a proxy to answer survey 
questions, restricting the sample to aged beneficiaries, and restricting the sample to beneficiaries 
with fee-for-service Medicare coverage. 
Also, as a further test for problems of mean reversion, I exclude the actual post-policy 
period from the analysis, designate the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 as “post-policy” years, and 
replicate the analysis in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  The IPS caps were based on utilization in 1994 so, if 
mean reversion were truly driving the results in Tables 3, 4 and 5, we would find similar 
coefficients in this falsification exercise in spite of the fact that the IPS did not yet exist.  
However, whereas the coefficient for the actual analysis in column 4 of Table 3 is -.109, a 
comparable coefficient in the falsification exercise is +.135, significant at the 10% level.  For 
every other measure of home health care utilization, the coefficient of interest, γ1, in the 
falsification exercise consistently takes the opposite sign from the coefficient in the true analysis.  
Thus, these results confirm that mean reversion is not driving my findings. 
One concern with the identification strategy is that there could be some correlation 
between my measure of the restrictiveness of the home health reimbursement cap and the 
restrictiveness of Medicare’s PPS for SNFs, which was implemented in 1998.  In fact, there does 
seem to be a correlation between the restrictiveness of the IPS and the restrictiveness of the SNF 
PPS.  In addition to identifying a negative impact on home health utilization, the measure of IPS 
restrictiveness identifies a negative “impact” of the home health reimbursement caps on SNF 
                                                 
22 The effects of the IPS on the first three quartiles of predicted costs are generally statistically indistinguishable 
from one another.  
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utilization.  In order to address this issue, I test the sensitivity of my results to using two 
alternative sub-samples of the data that avoid contamination from the SNF policy change. 
In one specification check, I exclude any beneficiaries who had an inpatient hospital stay 
during the year.  Medicare covers SNF stays only following inpatient hospital stays, so the 
change in Medicare reimbursement should have had no impact on beneficiaries who had no 
inpatient stays.  When I restrict my data set to this sub-sample, I no longer identify a decline in 
SNF utilization.  In another specification check, I exclude 1998 and 1999 data from the analysis.  
This strategy has the substantial drawback of cutting out most of the “post-policy” period, 
leaving only 1997 as a “treated” period.  It does, however, accomplish the goal of excluding any 
effects of the SNF policy change, since the SNF change occurred in mid-1998.  Using this sub-
sample, there is again no evidence of a decline in SNF utilization.  Both alternative analyses 
yield results that are otherwise comparable to the main analysis. 
Given the substantial state-to-state variation in pre-policy utilization that underlies the 
measure of restrictiveness, a natural question is what generated these regional differences.  For 
example, if this variation was driven entirely by differences in the health status of state residents, 
the restrictiveness measure could be simply measuring the differential trends in utilization by 
beneficiaries with different health statuses.  However, there is little evidence that the large pre-
policy differences are primarily attributable to differences in patient characteristics. 23  
In one analysis of the geographic variation, GAO (1996) showed that some states 
consistently provided more care than other states, even among patients with the same diagnosis, 
in data from the early 1990s.  Schore (1994) used detailed data about patient characteristics and 
diagnoses as well as regional and agency characteristics and was able to explain only about one-
                                                 
23 Wide geographic variation in overall Medicare expenditures has also been documented, with little evidence that 
differences in underlying beneficiary health can explain the variation.  See, for example, Skinner and Fisher (1997). 
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third of the regional variation in the number of visits per episode of care in her data from the 
early 1990s.  She proposes differences in physician and agency practice patterns, differences in 
the availability of nursing home or home- and community-based care, and unobservable patient 
characteristics as potential explanations for the remaining variation.  Other research suggests that 
the supply of substitutes for Medicare home health care explains some portion of the historical 
geographic variation in home health care usage.24  Taken together, the existing research on state 
variation in Medicare home health care spending suggests that the variation—while not fully 
explained—was largely attributable to a variety of historical supply factors and differences in 
practice styles.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
Long-term care is a policy issue that will become increasingly important in the coming 
decades.  Murtaugh et al. (1997) estimate that a person who reached the age of 65 in 1995 had a 
39% chance of being admitted to a nursing home during his or her remaining lifetime.  Thus, as 
the population ages, it will become increasingly important for policy-makers to consider options 
for long-term care policy and, in particular, whether home health care can provide a cost-
effective substitute for nursing home care.  This paper uses a substantial change in Medicare’s 
home care reimbursement policy to provide evidence on several important issues in long-term 
care policy and draws several conclusions. 
I find that the provision of home health care is quite sensitive to the structure of 
reimbursement.  In particular, when Medicare augmented its traditional fee-for-service 
                                                 
24 For example, Cohen and Tumlinson (1997), Kenney and Dubay (1992), and Swan and Benjamin (1990) all 
document an inverse relationship between the supply of nursing home care and the utilization of home health care.  
Likewise, Cohen and Tumlinson  (1997) and Kenney and Rajan (2000) find a negative relationship between 
Medicaid home health spending and Medicare home health utilization. 
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reimbursement with a more prospective, average per-patient cap, home health agencies 
responded by reducing care to relatively unhealthy beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, in spite of 
dramatic reductions in home health care utilization, I find no evidence that beneficiaries were 
more likely to move to long-term facilities.  This finding is consistent with earlier research that 
has suggested limited scope for substitution between home health care and nursing home care. I 
also find no evidence of increased expenditures for other types of medical care or of adverse 
consequences for beneficiary health. 
 The empirical results highlight several potential sources of efficiency change.  First, the 
reimbursement change led to a decline in consumption of home health care that was valued 
below its marginal cost, but had been consumed during the pre-policy period due to the absence 
of cost-sharing.  While the IPS did not explicitly impose any cost-sharing, it led to a decrease in 
the availability of home health care for those beneficiaries who were not willing to make out-of-
pocket payments.  In fact, out-of-pocket expenditures offset only 22% of the decline in Medicare 
expenditures, suggesting that 78% of the spending that was cut back after BBA 97 was for care 
that was valued by beneficiaries at less than its market price.  This decline in the over-provision 
of home health care represents a welfare gain.  
The empirical results suggest that there was considerable variation in responsiveness 
across different types of beneficiaries.  For instance, low-income beneficiaries exhibited more 
elastic demand for home health care than relatively high-income beneficiaries.  This finding may 
reflect the fact that low-income beneficiaries have a relatively high marginal utility from non-
health consumption, such as food and clothing, due to their low income.  If the social welfare 
function favors health care utilization patterns that are determined solely by health status and not 
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by income, however, it is possible that low-income beneficiaries responded to the IPS by under-
consuming home health care, which would represent welfare loss. 
The IPS also generated welfare loss by raising the level of financial risk faced by 
Medicare beneficiaries.  That is, the IPS increased the out-of-pocket liability faced by relatively 
unhealthy beneficiaries, who already face larger out-of-pocket medical expenditures than healthy 
beneficiaries.  The welfare loss is the risk premium that a Medicare beneficiary would be willing 
to pay to fully insure against the risk of being a beneficiary with high predicted home care costs, 
after the imposition of the IPS.  The exact level of the risk premium depends on assumptions 
about the form of the utility function, the degree of risk aversion in the Medicare population, and 
the minimum level of non-medical consumption guaranteed by society to beneficiaries whose 
medical expenses exceed their incomes. 
 Taken together, the welfare implications are ambiguous.  Depending on assumptions 
about the social welfare and individual utility functions, it is possible that the policy change 
either increased or decreased social welfare. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Means and standard deviations 
 
Variable Full sample 
 
Predicted High-
Cost Beneficiaries 
Predicted Low- 
Cost Beneficiaries 
Predicted home care costs 
 
2927 
(2351) 
6224 
(2070) 
1828 
(1056) 
 
Home health events 
 
12.59 
(63.95) 
34.04 
(104.52) 
5.45 
(40.09) 
Any home health events 
 
.150 
(.357) 
.314 
(.464) 
.096 
(.294) 
Home health events, conditional on any 
 
83.85 
(145.79) 
108.49 
(163.54) 
56.93 
(117.77) 
Expenditures 
 
 
446 
(3256) 
1357 
(6074) 
143 
(1215) 
Medicare home health expenditures 399 
(2368) 
1148 
(4134) 
131 
(1096) 
Medicaid home health expenditures 8 
(1377) 
24 
(2632) 
2 
(216) 
Out-of-pocket home health expenditures 
 
 
30 
(1653) 
96 
(3126) 
6 
(378) 
Facility events 
 
.105 
(.335) 
.291 
(.501) 
.043 
(.226) 
      Any events 
 
.097 
(.296) 
.270 
(.444) 
.039 
(.194) 
      Events, conditional on any 
 
1.08 
(.32) 
1.08 
(.29) 
1.10 
(.36) 
      Expenditures 
 
 
2875 
(12813) 
7896 
(18496) 
1202 
(9679) 
Inpatient events 
 
.373 
(.956) 
.649 
(1.239) 
.281 
(.821) 
Any events 
 
.217 
(.412) 
.348 
(.476) 
.174 
(.379) 
events, conditional on any 
 
1.72 
(1.38) 
1.87 
(1.46) 
1.62 
(1.31) 
Expenditures 
 
 
2836 
(9518) 
4902 
(12999) 
2147 
(7911) 
Outpatient events 
 
3.74 
(9.53) 
5.20 
(11.91) 
3.25 
(8.54) 
Any events 
 
.661 
(.473) 
.737 
(.440) 
.635 
(.481) 
events, conditional on any 
 
5.65 
(11.26) 
7.06 
(13.39) 
5.11 
(10.26) 
Expenditures 
 
 
812 
(3160) 
1128 
(3685) 
707 
(2957) 
Observations 97,193 24,293 72,900 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, continued 
 
Variable Full sample 
 
Predicted High-
Cost Beneficiaries 
Predicted Low- 
Cost Beneficiaries 
Medical provider events 
 
22.05 
(28.00) 
31.58 
(36.29) 
18.88 
(23.78) 
Any events 
 
.944 
(.231) 
.959 
(.198) 
.938 
(.241) 
Events, conditional on any 
 
23.37 
(28.28) 
32.93 
(36.46) 
20.12 
(24.04) 
Expenditures 
 
 
2094 
(4173) 
3079 
(5528) 
1765 
(3549) 
Age 
 
 
72.02 
(14.34) 
76.01 
(15.37) 
70.69 
(13.73) 
Male 
 
.436 .295 .483 
Married 
 
.472 .330 .520 
Body Mass Index 
 
 
25.38 
(6.23) 
24.30 
(8.43) 
25.73 
(5.27) 
Underweight 
 
.068 
 
.151 .040 
Overweight 
 
.510 .448 .530 
Difficulty stooping 
 
.167 .571 .032 
Difficulty lifting 
 
.159 .552 .028 
Difficulty writing 
 
.030 .119 .0001 
Difficulty walking 
 
.225 .715 .062 
Died .054 .126 .030 
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Table 2: Coefficients Used to Predict Home Care Costs 
 
Independent Variable Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Male -31 
(416) 
 
Married 
 
 
872** 
(402) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-1704** 
(612) 
Some difficulty stooping 
 
 
206 
(416) 
Lots of difficulty stooping 
 
 
1411** 
(488) 
Some difficulty lifting 10 lbs 
 
 
-25 
(406) 
Lots of difficulty lifting 10 lbs 
 
 
1003** 
(435) 
Some difficulty walking 2-3 blocks 
 
 
446 
(439) 
Lots of difficulty walking 2-3 blocks 
 
 
1420** 
(458) 
Some difficulty writing 
 
 
586* 
(322) 
Lots of difficulty writing 
 
4019** 
(538) 
 
Diabetes 
 
 
791** 
(314) 
Stroke 
 
 
609* 
(345) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
290 
(485) 
Broken hip 
 
 
396 
(412) 
Observations 6,187 
This table shows coefficients from a regression on the sub-sample of beneficiaries who used home health 
care during the pre-policy period.  The dependent variable is home health care costs.  Other predictors of 
home health care costs include: age group, race, and other health conditions (amputation of an arm or leg, 
angina pectoris, arthritis, cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, 
mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease). 
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Table 3: Home Health Utilization 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Visits 
(2) 
Visits 
(3) 
Visits 
(4) 
Visits 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
-.133** 
(.036) 
-.130** 
(.037) 
-.192** 
(.048) 
-.109* 
(.057) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
  
 
.284 
(.700) 
 
 
.285 
(.698) 
 
 
.283 
(.697) 
Married 
 
 
 -2.638** 
(.687) 
-2.590** 
(.684) 
-2.596** 
(.684) 
Male*Married 
 
 
 -.376 
(.862) 
-.400 
(.858) 
-.389 
(.858) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
 .0007** 
(.0003) 
.0008** 
(.0003) 
.0008** 
(.0003) 
Diabetes 
 
 
 3.161** 
(.645) 
3.120** 
(.645) 
3.123** 
(.645) 
Stroke 
 
 
 2.488** 
(.969) 
2.444** 
(.971) 
2.459** 
(.972) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
 -2.012 
(2.065) 
-2.095 
(2.079) 
-2.095 
(2.079) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State trends No No Yes Yes 
Visits94*Post No No No Yes 
Observations 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling.  Equations are estimated using OLS.  Standard errors are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 4: Home Health Utilization 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Visits 
(2) 
Visits 
(3) 
Visits 
(4) 
Visits 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
-.049** 
(.024) 
-.058** 
(.025) 
-.020 
(.032) 
.058 
(.046) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
-.293** 
(.119) 
-.253** 
(.117) 
-.588** 
(.161) 
-.582** 
(.161) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
  
 
.293 
(.700) 
 
 
.301 
(.698) 
 
 
.299 
(.698) 
Married 
 
 
 -2.641** 
(.686) 
-2.597** 
(.684) 
-2.603** 
(.684) 
Male*Married 
 
 
 -.382 
(.861) 
-.403 
(.857) 
-.392 
(.857) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
 .0007** 
(.0003) 
.0008** 
(.0003) 
.0008** 
(.0003) 
Diabetes 
 
 
 3.168** 
(.645) 
3.110** 
(.643) 
3.113** 
(.643) 
Stroke 
 
 
 2.489** 
(.969) 
2.441** 
(.971) 
2.456** 
(.972) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 -1.993 
(2.066) 
-2.091 
(2.079) 
-2.091 
(2.079) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State trends No No Yes Yes 
Visits94*Post No No No Yes 
Observations 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted costs 
and interactions of high predicted costs with post-BBA-97 and with Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877.  Equations are estimated using OLS.  Standard errors 
are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 5: Medicare Home Health Utilization 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Any Medicare 
Expenditures 
(2) 
Any Medicare 
Expenditures 
(3) 
Medicare 
Expenditures 
(4) 
Medicare 
Expenditures 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
-.0000004 
(.0002) 
.0004** 
(.0002) 
-1.89 
(1.99) 
3.22** 
(1.49) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -.0009** 
(.0003) 
 -17.67** 
(5.85) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
.009** 
(.002) 
 
 
.009** 
(.002) 
 
 
27.77 
(22.02) 
 
 
28.21 
(22.00) 
 
Married 
 
 
-.007* 
(.003) 
-.007** 
(.003) 
-19.91 
(28.02) 
-19.98 
(28.00) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-30.81 
(34.60) 
-31.18 
(34.56) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.000003 
(.000003) 
.000003 
(.000003) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
Diabetes 
 
 
.026** 
(.004) 
.026** 
(.004) 
294.38** 
(30.85) 
294.16** 
(30.77) 
Stroke 
 
 
.013** 
(.003) 
.013** 
(.003) 
108.27** 
(0.79) 
108.20** 
(40.78) 
 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
-.017** 
(.003) 
-.017** 
(.003) 
-158.50** 
(65.11) 
-158.93** 
(65.03) 
Observations 97,142 97,142 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable.  
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877.  Columns 1 and 2 show marginal effects from Probit models; columns 3 and 4 are estimated using OLS. Standard errors 
are clustered on state and year. 
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 Table 6: Beneficiary Utilization of Long-Term Care Facilities 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Any Events 
(2) 
Any Events 
(3) 
Expenditures 
(4) 
Expenditures 
(5) 
Medicare 
Expenditures 
(6) 
Medicare 
Expenditures 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
-.00005 
(.00008) 
 
.00003 
(.00010) 
.108 
(6.67) 
-1.86 
(7.20) 
-.58 
(.43) 
-.71** 
(.36) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -.00015 
(.00013) 
 6.66 
(18.62) 
 .38 
(1.79) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
.007** 
(.001) 
 
 
.007** 
(.001) 
 
 
559.10** 
(163.29) 
 
 
559.01** 
(163.29) 
 
 
17.80 
(13.52) 
 
 
17.82 
(13.50) 
Married 
 
 
-.020** 
(.002) 
-.020** 
(.002) 
-1330.80** 
(148.22) 
-1331.01** 
(148.37) 
1.57 
(11.61) 
1.49 
(11.61) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
202.65 
(242.07) 
203.23 
(242.15) 
-30.04 
(22.30) 
-29.88 
(22.28) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.000004** 
(.000001) 
.000004** 
(.000001) 
.57** 
(.13) 
.57** 
(.13) 
-.008 
(.010) 
-.008 
(.010) 
Diabetes 
 
 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-611.86** 
(144.95) 
-611.92** 
(145.03) 
8.97 
(10.77) 
8.92 
(10.77) 
Stroke 
 
 
.008** 
(.002) 
.008** 
(.002) 
-21.70 
(152.77) 
-21.71 
(152.76) 
16.18 
(14.98) 
16.17 
(14.98) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
.095** 
(.007) 
.095** 
(.008) 
7212.61** 
(483.60) 
7213.72** 
(483.66) 
15.09 
(18.84) 
15.43 
(18.83) 
Observations 97,161 97,161 97,192 97,192 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable. 
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877. Columns 1 and 2 show marginal effects from Probit models; other columns show estimates from OLS.  Standard errors 
are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 7: Beneficiary Utilization of Other Types of Care 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Inpatient 
Expenditures 
(2) 
Inpatient 
Expenditures 
(3) 
Outpatient 
Expenditures 
(4) 
Outpatient 
Expenditures 
(5) 
Medical Provider 
Expenditures 
(6) 
Medical Provider 
Expenditures 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
-1.76 
(7.95) 
-1.99 
(8.04) 
6.94** 
(2.44) 
7.38** 
(2.57) 
.70 
(3.17) 
.37 
(3.05) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 .58 
(17.41) 
 -1.53 
(4.22) 
 1.10 
(6.37) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
862.42** 
(105.85) 
 
 
862.52** 
(105.92) 
 
 
115.70** 
(34.92) 
 
 
115.74** 
(34.92) 
 
 
206.93** 
(47.35) 
 
 
206.92** 
(47.36) 
Married 
 
 
72.25 
(135.37) 
71.90 
(135.35) 
172.54** 
(61.29) 
172.52** 
(61.28) 
87.12 
(59.50) 
87.07 
(59.50) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-553.16** 
(242.33) 
-552.50** 
(242.36) 
-267.13** 
(110.26) 
-267.13** 
(110.26) 
-263.12** 
(101.40) 
-263.00** 
(101.41) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
-.24** 
(.12) 
-.24** 
(.12) 
-.14** 
(.06) 
-.14** 
(.06) 
-.11** 
(.05) 
-.11** 
(.05) 
Diabetes 
 
 
1258.63** 
(145.09) 
1258.43** 
(145.03) 
433.85** 
(58.55) 
433.82** 
(58.53) 
742.41** 
(51.63) 
742.39** 
(51.63) 
Stroke 
 
 
733.18** 
(147.74) 
733.13** 
(147.72) 
202.39** 
(50.86) 
 
202.39** 
(50.86) 
 
149.86** 
(64.12) 
149.86** 
(64.12) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
-620.19** 
(154.69) 
-618.79** 
(154.74) 
-72.51* 
(37.15) 
-72.48* 
(37.16) 
-274.63** 
(73.42) 
-274.38** 
(73.38) 
Observations 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable. 
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877.  Equations are estimated using OLS.  Standard errors are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 8: Total Beneficiary Utilization of Health Care 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Total  
Expenditures 
(2) 
Total  
Expenditures 
(3) 
Log Total 
Expenditures 
(4) 
Log Total 
Expenditures 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
3.45 
(13.72) 
7.98 
(13.14) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -16.18 
(33.88) 
 -.002 
(.002) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
1715.04** 
(249.52) 
 
 
1715.72** 
(249.56) 
 
 
.07** 
(.02) 
 
 
.07** 
(.02) 
Married 
 
 
-1049.10** 
(303.99) 
-1049.99** 
(304.12) 
-.09** 
(.02) 
-.09** 
(.02) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-939.27* 
(507.37) 
-938.06* 
(507.45) 
-.07** 
(.04) 
-.07** 
(.04) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.11 
(.26) 
.11 
(.26) 
.000006 
(.000019) 
.000006 
(.000019) 
Diabetes 
 
 
2452.70** 
(285.52) 
2452.00** 
(285.46) 
.34** 
(.02) 
.34** 
(.02) 
Stroke 
 
 
1398.11** 
(291.05) 
1397.91** 
(290.99) 
.14** 
(.02) 
.14** 
(.02) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
6061.58** 
(511.65) 
6064.50** 
(511.36) 
.55** 
(.03) 
.55** 
(.03) 
Observations 97,193 97,193 94,409 94,409 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable.  
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877. Equations are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 9: Body Mass Index (BMI) 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
BMI 
(2) 
BMI 
(3) 
Underweight 
(BMI<18.5) 
(4) 
 Underweight 
(BMI<18.5) 
(5) 
Overweight 
(BMI>25) 
(6) 
Overweight 
(BMI>25) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.002 
(.004) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
.00006 
(.00017) 
-.0005 
(.0003) 
-.0002 
(.0004) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -.002 
(.012) 
 .00004 
(.00029) 
 -.0013* 
(.0007) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
-.600** 
(.064) 
 
 
-.600** 
(.064) 
 
 
-.009** 
(.002) 
 
 
-.009** 
(.002) 
 
 
.003 
(.005) 
 
 
.003 
(.005) 
Married 
 
 
-.134 
(.101) 
-.133 
(.101) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
-.034** 
(.007) 
-.034** 
(.007) 
Male*Married 
 
 
.959** 
(.170) 
.957** 
(.170) 
-.024** 
(.003) 
-.024** 
(.003) 
.117** 
(.010) 
.117** 
(.010) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.00001 
(.00008) 
.0000004 
(.000085) 
-.000005** 
(.000001) 
-.000004** 
(.000001) 
.000007 
(.000005) 
.000007 
(.000005) 
Diabetes 
 
 
1.482** 
(.086) 
1.482** 
(.085) 
-.015** 
(.002) 
-.015** 
(.002) 
.119** 
(.006) 
.119** 
(.006) 
Stroke 
 
 
-.453** 
(.083) 
-.453** 
(.083) 
.007** 
(.002) 
.007** 
(.002) 
-.045** 
(.007) 
-.045** 
(.007) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
-.401** 
(.121) 
-.404** 
(.121) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
-.079** 
(.008) 
-.079** 
(.008) 
Observations 96,007 96,007 95,953 95,953 95,998 95,998 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable. 
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877.  Columns 1 and 2 show estimates from OLS; other columns show marginal effects from Probit models.  Standard errors 
are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 10: Functional Limitations 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Stooping 
(2) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Stooping 
(3) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Lifting 
(4) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Lifting 
(5) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Walking 
(6) 
Lots of Difficulty 
Walking 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
.00001 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
-.0001 
(.0003) 
.0002 
(.0003) 
.0003 
(.0003) 
.0005 
(.0003) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -.0006 
(.0006) 
 -.0011* 
(.0007) 
 -.0007 
(.0005) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
-.039** 
(.004) 
 
 
-.039** 
(.004) 
 
 
-.049** 
(.003) 
 
 
-.049** 
(.003) 
 
 
-.036** 
(.004) 
 
 
-.036** 
(.004) 
Married 
 
 
-.041** 
(.005) 
-.041** 
(.005) 
-.046** 
(.005) 
-.046** 
(.005) 
-.056** 
(.005) 
-.056** 
(.005) 
Male*Married 
 
 
.061** 
(.006) 
.061** 
(.006) 
.080** 
(.007) 
.080** 
(.007) 
.093** 
(.006) 
.093** 
(.006) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.000028** 
(.000003) 
.000028** 
(.000003) 
.00004** 
(.000004) 
.00004** 
(.000004) 
.000047** 
(.000003) 
.000047** 
(.000003) 
Diabetes 
 
 
.029** 
(.005) 
.029** 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.005) 
.027** 
(.005) 
.027** 
(.005) 
Stroke 
 
 
.036** 
(.006) 
.036** 
(.006) 
.036** 
(.005) 
.036** 
(.006) 
.027** 
(.006) 
.027** 
(.006) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
.118** 
(.010) 
.118** 
(.010) 
.154** 
(.010) 
.154** 
(.010) 
.128** 
(.009) 
.128** 
(.009) 
Observations 97,629 97,629 97,629 97,629 97,629 97,629 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease). Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable. Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also 
include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877.  All 
columns show marginal effects from Probit models.  Standard errors are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 11: Other Sources of Payment for Home Health Utilization 
 
Independent variable 
(1) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(2) 
Total 
Expenditures 
(3) 
Medicare  
Expenditures 
(4) 
Medicare 
Expenditures 
(5) 
Medicaid 
Expenditures 
(6) 
Medicaid 
Expenditures 
(7) 
Out-of-pocket 
Expenditures 
(8) 
Out-of-pocket 
Expenditures 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
 
 
-.72 
(2.10) 
3.07* 
(1.62) 
-1.89 
(1.99) 
3.22** 
(1.49) 
.42 
(.35) 
.46 
(.45) 
.42 
(.62) 
-.67* 
(.41) 
Post-BBA 97*Restrict 
*Predicted High Cost 
 -13.09** 
(5.99) 
 -17.67** 
(5.85) 
 -.16 
(1.09) 
 3.82** 
(1.59) 
 
Personal Characteristics 
Male 
 
 
 
 
21.50 
(28.80) 
 
 
 
21.80 
(29.26) 
 
 
27.77 
(22.02) 
 
 
28.21 
(22.00) 
 
 
 
-10.56 
(15.36) 
 
 
-10.55 
(15.38) 
 
 
4.53 
(7.85) 
 
 
4.40 
(7.84) 
Married 
 
 
-27.62 
(52.22) 
-27.59 
(52.21) 
-19.91 
(28.02) 
-19.98 
(28.00) 
-30.23 
(25.16) 
-30.23 
(25.15) 
26.03 
(33.51) 
26.14 
(33.52) 
Male*Married 
 
 
-28.15 
(57.86) 
-28.58 
(57.84) 
-30.81 
(34.60) 
-31.18 
(34.56) 
37.71 
(34.98) 
37.71 
(34.98) 
-34.82 
(27.24) 
-34.91 
(27.25) 
Predicted Cost 
 
 
.04** 
(.02) 
.04** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
.02 
(.02) 
.02 
(.02) 
.004 
(.004) 
.004 
(.004) 
Diabetes 
 
 
276.46** 
(36.36) 
276.35** 
(36.30) 
294.38** 
(30.85) 
294.16** 
(30.77) 
-19.68 
(17.41) 
-19.68 
(17.41) 
-2.18 
(6.36) 
 
-2.08 
(6.37) 
Stroke 
 
 
158.79** 
(68.72) 
158.76** 
(68.72) 
108.27** 
(0.79) 
108.20** 
(40.78) 
 
-34.50 
(33.10) 
-34.50 
(33.10) 
86.03** 
(41.70) 
86.06** 
(41.71) 
Alzheimer’s 
 
 
-231.72** 
(99.39) 
-232.38** 
(99.35) 
-158.50** 
(65.11) 
-158.93** 
(65.03) 
-25.87 
(29.69) 
-25.87 
(29.70) 
-31.42 
(58.85) 
-31.69 
(58.86) 
Observations 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 97,193 
Other control variables include year, state, state trends, age group, race, education, income, and other health conditions (amputation of arm or leg, angina pectoris, arthritis, broken hip, 
cancer, emphysema, hardening of the arteries, hypertension, mental retardation, mental disorders, myocardial infarction, osteoporosis, other heart conditions, paralysis, and Parkinson’s 
disease) and level of difficulty with walking, writing, lifting and kneeling. Regressions also control for 1994 state average visits per user interacted with a post-policy dummy variable.  
Regressions that show interactions with high predicted costs also include a control for high predicted cost as well as an interaction of high predicted cost with post-BBA 97 and with 
Restrict.  High predicted cost means predicted costs > $3877. Equations are estimated using OLS.  Standard errors are clustered on state and year. 
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Table 12: Impact of the IPS, By Income Group 
  Below the Poverty Line    Above the Poverty Line 
 
Dependent Variable 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Main effect 
(3) 
Interaction 
(4) 
Mean 
(5) 
Main effect 
(6) 
Interaction 
Home health visits 
 
 
19.21 
(78.87) 
.066 
(.095) 
 
-.835** 
(.208) 
10.68 
(58.80) 
.064 
(.056) 
-.412* 
(.246) 
Total home health expenditures 
 
567 
(2747) 
5.92* 
(3.35) 
 
-26.69** 
(6.53) 
411 
(3388) 
3.03 
(2.13) 
-4.07 
(10.09) 
       Medicare 
 
543 
(2689) 
5.97* 
(3.34) 
 
-25.81** 
(6.42) 
357 
(2260) 
3.19* 
(1.90) 
-12.20 
(9.67) 
       Medicaid 
 
 
6 
(178) 
-.02 
(.14) 
-.22 
(.28) 
9 
(1560) 
.60 
(.58) 
-.10 
(1.78) 
      Out-of-pocket 
 
5 
(149) 
.02 
(.14) 
 
-.72* 
(.40) 
37 
(1859) 
-.82 
(.51) 
6.56** 
(2.58) 
Any facility care 
 
 
.189 
(.391) 
.0003 
(.0005) 
-.0004 
(.0007) 
.070 
(.256) 
-.00002 
(.00009) 
-.0001 
(.0001) 
Facility expenditures 6,018 
(19,830) 
-8.43 
(24.55) 
 
-13.42 
(36.40) 
1,967 
(9,712) 
-1.79 
(4.96) 
13.80 
(18.29) 
Inpatient expenditures 3,185 
(10,795) 
-20.37 
(15.35) 
 
-15.55 
(25.87) 
2,735 
(9,114) 
3.32 
(8.40) 
16.65 
(24.02) 
Total expenditures 
 
13,871 
(26,107) 
-2.44 
(34.52) 
 
-66.36 
(59.38) 
9324 
(18,035) 
9.03 
(12.77) 
8.73 
(39.55) 
Difficulty with stooping 
 
.239 
(.426) 
.0006 
(.0006) 
 
.0001 
(.0010) 
.146 
(.353) 
.000004 
(.00031) 
-.0019** 
(.0007) 
Difficulty with walking 
 
.317 
(.466) 
.0008 
(.0007) 
 
-.0003 
(.0010) 
.200 
(.400) 
.0003 
(.0003) 
 
-.0013** 
(.0006) 
Observations 21,786 21,786 21,786 75,407 75,407 75,407 
Columns 1 and 4 show means of the dependent variable.  Columns 2 and 5 show the coefficient on the interaction of a post-BBA97 dummy and the restrictiveness measure.  Columns 
3 and 5 show the interaction between post-BBA97, the restrictiveness measure, and a predicted high cost dummy.  The regression specification is the same as in earlier tables. 
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Figure 1: Medicare Home Health Expenditures
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Source: U.S. Congress (2000). 
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Figure 2: Visits per Medicare Beneficiary
year
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Figure 3: Medicare Payment Per Visit
year
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Source: U.S. Congress (2000). 
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Figure 4: Users per 1000 Beneficiaries, by Type of State
year
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Figure 5: Visits per User, by Type of State
year
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Sources: Health Care Financing Review’s annual statistical supplement, GAO (2000), author’s 
calculations. 
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Figure 6: Home Health Visits in Low Restrictiveness States
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Figure 7: Home Health Visits in High Restrictiveness States
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Source: Author’s calculations from the MCBS. 
